shelton_webBy William C. Shelton

(The opinions and views expressed in the commentaries of The Somerville Times belong solely to the authors of those commentaries and do not reflect the views or opinions of The Somerville Times, its staff or publishers)

At the end of October the Principle Group presented its Neighborhood Plan for Union Square and Boynton Yards redevelopment. The city administration had requested it, the US2 developers paid for it, and the redevelopment district’s neighbors rejected it.

In neighborhood meetings called to discuss the Plan, a Civic Advisory Committee session, and in dozens of individual conversations they say that it reflects neither the SomerVision Comprehensive Plan nor their extensive participation in the long Somerville-by-Design Process.

In particular, it triples the amount of development specified by SomerVision; almost quadruples SomerVision’s housing units target while reducing their sizes; sets aside too little green space; is silent about parking specifics; and assaults Union Square’s human scale with superblock monoliths.

Neighbors do like the street redesigns.

On November 18, city officials released a Draft Fiscal Impact Analysis for Union Square and Boynton Yards. In it, the TischlerBise consulting firm projects city revenues and expenses that the Neighborhood Plan’s implementation would generate.

TishlerBise has applied its considerable expertise and rigor to modeling fiscal outcomes. But the consultants must work within the assumptions that city officials set for them. And those assumptions strongly suggest why the Neighborhood Plan dictates such objectionable development targets, and why they probably can’t be achieved.

From a careful read of the Analysis, I infer that assumptions were chosen to accomplish three objectives. The first is to show sufficient net income to justify the redevelopment.

An earlier draft analysis presented at last May’s Somerville-by-Design meeting projected net income that was so feeble as to have caused numerous attendees to question why we should bother. But the current draft says that over the twenty-year term of the projection net income will average $10 million per year.

The second objective is to produce enough new development to generate property tax revenues sufficient to replace the failing 130-year-old sewer system while still accomplishing the first objective.

And the third is to produce a sizable chunk of the new housing units that the mayor has decreed is Somerville’s duty to absorb, while accomplishing the first two objectives.

In response to neighbors’ objections that the Neighborhood Plan’s vast development goals violate SomerVision’s goals, city officials have said that SomerVision is a twenty-year plan, while the Neighborhood Plan is a thirty- or forty-year plan.

The Fiscal Impact Analysis refutes this rationalization. To achieve its projected net income, 100% of the Neighborhood Plan must be built within twenty years.

Considering the length and impact of recent economic cycles, this is unlikely. Considering traffic and parking requirements, it’s even less likely, despite the city’s worthwhile collaboration with Audi.

As massive as the Plan’s development targets are, its 6.4 million square feet of projected new construction includes no parking. And the Fiscal Impact Analysis includes no costs for parking structures or explanation as to who will pay for them.

The more stressed that a district’s infrastructure becomes, the less valuable its properties become, and the less attractive it becomes to developers. It is reasonable to questions whether the most efficient Union Square/Boynton Yards infrastructure that we can realistically anticipate could support the assumed level of development.

From here, the Analysis’s questionable assumptions proliferate. On the revenue side, it does not seem to account for the 35%-property-tax exemption that accrues to owners who occupy their own properties. Unless all of the 2,846 units projected in the analysis are rental units. Factoring in this exemption would lower revenues by a material amount.

It assumes $7.9 million per year in local room excise taxes from a 175-room Union Square hotel with an average room rate of $239 and 81.6% annual occupancy. It is unclear who the hotel’s market would be, when it would be built, or why it could sustain a room rate that is twice that of the Holiday Inn’s.

State aid, which is always precarious, now comprises a quarter of the city’s budget. The Analysis assumes that state aid will increase proportionately with population. But if redevelopment were to improve Somerville’s fiscal and economic health to the extent that the analysis projects, state aid’s continuation at the same level is uncertain.

Key assumptions on the expense side are also questionable. The analysis assumes no costs for new open and green space, or for its maintenance.

SomerVision set a citywide goal of 125 acres of new open space. The redevelopment planning area’s proportion of that would be 25 acres. The Civic Advisory Committee set a goal of 20.4 acres.

The Neighborhood Plan whittled that down to twelve acres, three of which consist of widened street verges and adjusting Union Square’s main parking area to the same height as surrounding sidewalks while declaring it a “plaza” when it’s not being used to park cars.

The Analysis states that “Public space proposed in Union Square and Boynton Yards is assumed to be paid for and built by private development.” Considering the miniscule proportion of the “D” blocks that the Neighborhood Plan obligates the US2 developers to commit to open space, there is little reason to believe that the city’s Planning authorities would compel future developers to make dramatically larger commitments.

And though the mayor has strongly advocated for a “civic block” that would include a library and other city services, the Analysis assumes no capital costs for new civic buildings, nor costs for building maintenance.

The one exception is an assumed $20.5 million cost to replace the Lowell Street fire station with one situated closer to the Square. The adequacy of this arrangement is worth a whole column in itself.

In fact, column space limits constrain how much I can write about questionable operating expense assumptions. But one line item is worth noting.

At 18% of the city’s budget, Public Safety costs are its second-largest segment. The Analysis reasonably projects additional police and fire costs by projecting the number of new police and fire calls. But it does not do what TischlerBise does in other municipal fiscal impact analyses, such as on page 26 of this one.

It does not break down the incidence of calls and costs-per-call by land use. Doing so would reveal that office uses generate a small fraction of the public safety costs that a comparable unit of residential space generates.

And that hints at what is driving the questionable assumptions. A redevelopment plan that both generates positive net income and pays for needed infrastructure improvements cannot also accommodate the level of housing development proposed in the Neighborhood Plan.

Residential uses pay only 60% the tax rate that commercial uses pay. But they generate higher municipal costs in every significant budget category.

If our city’s leaders are serious about achieving fiscal health, they must zone Union Square and Boynton Yards to maximize commercial development. And they cannot lead the redevelopment effort with massive construction of new housing that would absorb needed infrastructure and usurp the sites most attractive to commercial developers.

 

Comments are closed.