While defending the city's use of a reserve force, Chief Kelleher did not address much of the substance of my original column, and some of his points were inaccurate.

There is one point on which the Chief and I agree, however. He wrote, "The safety of the community and our fellow firefighters depends on selecting the best possible candidates."

The city's hiring practices previous to the reserve force's creation unequivocally produced this outcome. I am fortunate to know this from direct experience, as well as from the testimony of others.

Three years ago, a stovetop fire in my home brought a swift response from Somerville firefighters. They were thorough, ensuring that any lingering threat was completely extinguished. And they were uniformly courteous, friendly, and informative.

I know of no fire incident in Somerville in which they have not demonstrated the same effectiveness and courtesy. So I would like to see firefighter candidates selected without political influence, who will continue the department's impressive and appreciated record of service.

In my earlier column, I wrote that 8 of the candidates approved by the Board of Aldermen in November 2008 had been in the bottom third of the civil service list. I erred in not realizing that the city had requisitioned a second set of names from the same civil service list, and that the first cohort of firefighters hired under the new system consisted of 13, not 10.

With this second requisition from the list, the city went all the way down to the fifty-second candidate on the list. That candidate was illegally put on the reserve force after the civil service list that he was on had expired. He was the son-in-law of a veteran firefighter.

In a sleight-of-hand, Chief Kelleher responded that the group of candidates approved in March of this year, 15 months after the group that I referred to, " were at the top of the HRD list."

To reach that low on the civil service list in order to appoint 13 firefighters is unheard of. There are only four possible explanations.

First, candidates' background checks eliminated most of the higher-scoring candidates. The rationale offered by the mayor for creation of a reserve force is that once candidates are on it, the city can take the time to fully check their backgrounds so that worthy candidates can immediately be hired as permanent firefighters when the city needs them and slots are available at the fire academy. Indeed, an indignant Mayor Joseph A. Curtatone told the Board of Aldermen that the city only hires candidates with the highest integrity.

Firefighter candidates receive a preference in appointment if they have lived in the city for one year before taking the civil service exam. But four of those who claimed a residence preference and were appointed to the reserve force do not show up on the city census for that period at the addresses where they claimed residence. Close relatives do appear on the census at those addresses. Nor were these candidates registered to vote at those addresses. One wonders what the background checks were checking.

A second potential explanation is the manner in which candidates were notified of their eligibility. Those requisitioned from the firefighter civil service list received a notice from the Massachusetts Human Resources Division (HRD) stating that if they wished to be considered for appointment as a "permanent reserve firefighter," they must appear at City Hall and indicate their interest. Only 21 of the first list of 40 showed up.

Of those who didn't, many probably wanted to be permanent fire fighters, not a "permanent reserve firefighter." But the city made no effort to inform them that they could only become permanent firefighters by first being on a "reserve" fire force. Those who did appear learned of this through some other means.

Third is that candidates who had made the effort to take the test did not want the job, despite the down economy. A fourth explanation is that there was, in fact, favoritism in the selection of candidates. Each of these potential explanations raises troubling questions about how the reserve fire force is used.

Chief Kellher failed to respond to several other substantive points that I raised.

The first group of candidates was appointed to the reserve force on November 17, 2008. They were made permanent firefighters the very next day. This contradicts the rationale for a reserve force. The city could have achieved the same result by simply following normal civil service procedures.

Aldermen were told that 42 other Massachusetts municipalities use a reserve fire force. In fact 43 of 351 Massachusetts municipalities at some point voted to accept the relevant statutes. But only a small minority actually uses a reserve force.

Of 50 Massachusetts cities and towns surveyed for my earlier column, 14 had approved the statutes, but only Lawrence, Lowell, Peabody, Everett and Revere appoint permanent firefighters from a reserve force. None of those 5 cities uses the reserve force as its sole and exclusive method of appointing permanent firefighters as Somerville does.

In December 2009, Sean O'Brien, a disabled veteran who served two tours in Iraq disarming explosive devices, wrote a letter to the mayor explaining that he was number one on the civil service list and asking for a meeting. The city did not requisition an updated list, and the mayor did not respond to the letter.

Chief Kelleher's op-ed was intended to reassure readers of my earlier column of the reserve force's fairness and efficacy. For me, it did the opposite.